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ABSTRACT

This study investigated potential impacts of the heterogeneity in consumer
valuation of fuel economy on the compliance with fuel economy standards with two
analytical approaches. One approach is to provide theoretical analysis of the
heterogeneity impacts on the market acceptance of high-efficiency vehicles. The
other approach utilizes a consumer choice based simulation method to analyze
the heterogeneity impacts on the compliance with the Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) Standards for the entire light duty vehicle fleet in the U.S. Our
findings suggest two possible conditions which are defined based on relative
acceptance of high-efficiency vehicles in the market, and they have different
heterogeneity impacts: (1) the “Likely-Accept” condition – the CAFE compliance is
highly possible, but the heterogeneity can add additional risks in the compliance;
and (2) the “Likely-Reject” condition – the CAFE may have deficiency in
compliance, but the heterogeneity can reduce the risks and improve the possibility
in compliance. The two conditions are mainly dependent on consumers’ average
valuation of fuel economy in the market, and are also affected by other factors,
such as incremental cost of fuel efficiency technologies and future oil price
projections.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

To improve transportation energy security and environmental quality, the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) have coordinated a national program for enacting and implementing
U.S. fuel economy standards. Within the national program, there are two jointly
promulgated national standards for the light duty vehicles (LDV) in the United
States, including the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards and the
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions standards (EPA and NHTSA, 2012). In
particular, the CAFE standards are dedicated to reducing the LDV’s dependency
on conventional fossil fuels, and the GHG standards are to reduce GHG emissions
of LDVs. Both standards are fleet average standards, and there is no requirement
for single vehicle. Compliance with both standards depends on the actual market
share of vehicle choices with different fuel efficiencies. Therefore, it is important to
understand how consumers value fuel economy and whether they are willing to
purchase high- or low-efficiency vehicles.
Many existing literatures are dedicated to understanding consumer
valuation of fuel economy, and there is a heated debate on that. Several academic
opinions (Fan and Rubin, 2010; Greene et al., 2013) believe that consumers are
1

generally myopic and significantly under-value fuel economy. Under this
assumption, additional subsidy programs are required to help manufacturers to
comply with the standards. Other studies (Allcott and Wozny, 2013; Busse et al.,
2013; James et al., 2015; Sallee et al., 2016) support that consumers have full or
near full valuation of fuel economy, and manufacturers have great confidences in
complying with standards. These studies set up solid basis in understanding
consumer valuation and their impacts on the compliance with fuel economy
standards. However, there is one major limitation that they only focused on
estimating the average valuation level for all consumers, and the heterogeneity
was normally not considered. Note that, the heterogeneity in consumer valuation
does exist, and has been suggested by prior studies. For example, the survey
study (Greene et al., 2013) revealed that the consumer valuation in terms of
accepted payback period can range between less than 1 year and more than 19
years. With the heterogeneity, consumers may have distinct acceptance levels of
fuel efficiency technologies. Bento et al. (Bento et al., 2012b) suggested that the
heterogeneity may reduce the average fuel economy in the market, and Sallee et
al. (Sallee et al., 2016) stated that bias is inevitable in projecting the future energy
market if the heterogeneity in consumer valuation is not properly model.
This study aims at evaluating potential impacts of the heterogeneity in
consumer valuation on the compliance with fuel economy standards. Firstly, I will
theoretically prove how the heterogeneity may affect the sale of high-efficiency
2

vehicles under a simplified representation of the vehicle market. Then, I will use
an existing vehicle choice model, called the Market Acceptance of Advanced
Automotive Technologies (MA3T) model (Lin and Greene, 2010; Lin and Li, 2014;
Liu and Lin, 2016) to simulate the heterogeneity impacts on the fuel economy
standards’ compliance with a real-world setting – the entire national LDV fleet.
Note that, this study focuses on the impact analysis of the CAFE standards.
Conclusions are generalizable and can also be applied to the GHG standards.
In the rest of this paper, I will firstly provide detailed literature reviews on
existing studies on fuel economy valuation in Section 2. Then, I will present the
theory and methodology used in this study in Section 3. In the results section in
Section 4, I will consider the entire LDV fleet in the United States to show the
impacts of the heterogeneity on the CAFE compliance. Finally, the study will be
concluded in Section 5.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

Consumers’ valuation of fuel economy (fuel cost or fuel efficiency technologies
stated in some studies) has received great research attention recently. Specifically,
this research area focuses on understanding whether or not consumers value fuel
economy and to what extend fuel economy has been undervalued or overvalued
by consumers. This knowledge is critically important in evaluating future
transportation energy market: whether fuel efficient vehicle technologies like,
electric vehicles, be successful to replace conventional vehicles; and whether
consumers prefer to invest additional money on conventional fuel-efficient
technologies to save future fuel cost. From policy prospective, this information is
particularly important for evaluating the feasibility of CAFE and GHG standards
(EPA and NHTSA, 2012), the compliance with which relies on whether consumers
prefer expansive but fuel efficient vehicles to cheap but less fuel efficient vehicles.
Therefore, it is of great importance to carefully investigate consumers’ valuation
on fuel economy.
However, great uncertainties exist in understanding whether or not
consumer undervalue or full value fuel economy. For instance, National Research
Council (2015) stated that factors such as lack of knowledge about fuel savings,
contrasting opinion against EPA rating, and loss aversion of certain consumers
4

may lead to a conclusion of undervaluation. On the other hand, incorrect
interpolation of fuel cost saving for high fuel-efficient vehicle can contribute to over
valuation of economy. Also, there are many other factors that may create bias to
determine consumers’ valuation. For example, Langer and Miller (2012) stated that
manufacturers also provide cash incentive for inefficient vehicles and increase the
sale price of efficient vehicles when fuel price increases. This pricing scheme does
make it easier to underestimate consumers’ valuation of fuel economy, and it may
downplay the effect by about 13%.
In the rest of this section, I will demonstrate existing studies on fuel
economy valuation.

2.1 Full Valuation versus Under-valuation

Existing literatures on investigating consumers’ valuation of fuel economy can be
divided into two opinions: (1) one opinion is in support of significant undervaluation
fuel economy, and representative studies are such as (Greene et al., 2013;
National Research Council, 2015); (2) the other opinion is that consumers can fully
value fuel economy, and example studies are (Allcott and Wozny, 2013; Busse et
al., 2013; Sallee et al., 2015). For a complete list of references on this subject,
readers are referred to the study (Helfand and Wolverton, 2009). Both opinions
have been equally supported in existing literature, according to the statement “…
5

it found as many studies with undervaluation of fuel economy as there where
studies with about-right or overvaluation.” in the recently published technical
assessment report (EPA et al., 2016) for the mid-term evaluation. In the rest of this
subsection, I will demonstrate how the conclusion on whether or not consumers
value fuel economy is derived in this study.

2.1.1 Studies in Support of Consumer Full Valuation of Fuel Economy
Busse et al. (2013) derived economic models to evaluate whether or not
consumers appear myopic in fuel efficient technology market based on historical
new and old vehicle sales. In particular, the study tested how consumers respond
with different fuel prices, namely, whether or not they would like to purchase fuel
efficient vehicles. The study indicated that the market in the old vehicles is not
significantly affected by the change in fuel price. However, though the fuel
economies between new vehicles are not significantly different, obvious changes
in market share between fuel-efficient and less fuel-efficient vehicles are observed
when oil price changes. In addition, with these relationships, the study derived a
range of implicit discount rates with assumptions on demand elasticities, and they
found that there is little evidence on consumers’ undervaluation of fuel economy.
Allcott and Wozny (2013) developed a static discrete choice model and
applied the model to historical passenger vehicle registration data. The study found
that slight undervaluation exists, and consumers are indifferent between $1.00 in
6

discounted future fuel cost saving and $0.76 in investing in vehicle fuel efficient
technologies. The study also stated that there is a up to 6 months delay in
consumers’ response to fuel price change.
Grigolon et al. (2014) made use of aggregate demand data in European
market to evaluate whether or not consumers under-value fuel economies and
investigated the effectiveness of tax policies. The study only indicated modest
undervaluation of fuel costs, and they stated that it is important to account for
consumer heterogeneity in mileage and other factors which are correlated with
consumer valuation.
Sallee et al. (2015) focused on investigating the relationship between used
car vehicle price and fuel price, and found that even for the used car market
consumers can still fully value fuel economy.

2.1.2 Studies in Support of Consumer Under Valuation of Fuel Economy
Greene et al. (2013) analyzed the household surveys that were conducted in 2004,
2011, 2012, and 2013 in evaluating consumers’ valuation of fuel economy. The
surveys collected respondents’ opinions on whether or not they would like to spend
money on fuel efficient technologies for potential future cost saving. The findings
from the four surveys are quite consistent over time, and the average calculated
payback period is about 3 years, indicating consumers substantially undervalue
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fuel economy. They also found that there is no obvious correlation between the
valuation and consumers’ other attributes.
Fan and Rubin (2010) developed a two-stage statistical hedonic price model
with new vehicle registration data in Maine in 2007 to determine consumers’
marginal willingness in paying for one unit increase in fuel economy. Significant
undervaluation in fuel economies are observed. When converted to discount rate,
car buyers on average have discount rate of 44%, while truck buyers on average
have discount rate of 82%. If 7% discount rate is considered, those findings are
equivalent to 3 three years’ vehicle lifetime for cars and 1 year’s vehicle lifetime for
trucks. The findings in undervaluation are the most significant in existing literature.

2.2 Importance of Heterogeneity in Consumer Valuation

All existing studies demonstrated above focus on modeling or analyzing if
consumers undervalue or full-value fuel economies. The heated debate in the
existing literature indicates great uncertainty in this knowledge. Either of the two
opinions in consumers’ valuation may significantly affect CAFE and GHG
compliance, which has been concluded by (Xie and Lin, 2017a) which shows the
importance of all these referenced studies.
However, most of these previous studies modeled consumers as a single
agent, and expectation of consumer valuation is taken, which is applied to all
8

consumers in the market. Heterogeneity is not considered. According to previous
studies, heterogeneity in consumer fuel economy valuation does exist, which has
been shown by, for example, the histograms of the survey data presented in
(Greene et al., 2013) as shown in Figure 2.1. Figure 2.1 shows the histogram of
calculated payback periods of consumers based on 2012 survey data. Though the
average payback period is 3.4 years, great heterogeneity exists among
consumers. The payback period can range between 0.2 years and 19 years. In
addition, the second stage hedonic price model developed by (Fan and Rubin,
2010) indicated consumers’ valuation in fuel economy significantly differs between
consumers with different educations and ages. It was noted that consumers with
higher education levels and/or order age are more likely to buy fuel efficient
vehicles.
Without proper consideration of this heterogeneity, Sallee et al. (2015)
indicated that bias is inevitable in projecting future energy market. This concern
has been shown by Bento et al. (2012a)’s study which showed that it may
downplay the average of fuel economy in the market. Therefore, to better evaluate
CAFE compliance as well as the competitiveness of advanced vehicle
technologies in future market, it is important to include heterogeneity in future
modelling efforts.

9

Figure 2.1. Example histogram of payback periods among respondents (Greene
et al., 2013)
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CHAPTER THREE
MATERIALS AND METHODS

In this section, firstly I will theoretically show how the heterogeneity affects the
acceptance of fuel efficiency technologies with a simplified representation of the
vehicle market. Then, I will demonstrate a consumer choice based simulation
approach to evaluate impacts of the heterogeneity on the CAFE compliance for
the entire LDV fleet in United States.

3.1 Impacts of the Heterogeneity in Valuation on Acceptance of
High-Efficiency Technologies

I use a simple case to show how the consumer valuation heterogeneity may affect
the competitiveness of high-efficiency vehicles. In a vehicle market, for simplicity,
I assume there are only two vehicle choices: high-efficiency vehicle and lowefficiency vehicle. As the name suggests, the high-efficiency vehicle has lower fuel
cost with better fuel economy, but is more expensive in purchase price due to the
additional fuel efficiency technologies. Whereas, the low-efficiency vehicle has
higher fuel cost but is cheaper in purchase price. Without loss of generality, I
assume that other vehicle performances (e.g., engine power), features (e.g., cargo
11

size), and pricing schemes (i.e., same markup factor) remain the same between
the two choices. Thus, there are only two considerations, namely, vehicle purchase
price and annual fuel cost, when consumers are making choices between the two
vehicles. Notations of the two cost components are defined as follows:

•

Vehicle 1 (high-efficiency): vehicle purchase price – C1 and annual fuel cost
– A1 ; and

•

Vehicle 2 (low-efficiency): vehicle purchase price – C2 and annual fuel cost
– A2 .
Then, I have the following cost relationship: (1) C1  C2 , and (2) A1  A2 . Let

 (   0 )be the valuation factor that converts the annual fuel cost to the present
value. Note that,  here depicts the level of consumer valuation of fuel economy.
I can define the generalized costs for the two vehicle choices as C1   A1 and

C2   A2 . The one with lower generalized cost is more likely accepted by
consumers. Let  be the breakeven point where the two generalized costs are
equal. Then, we have the following two possible conditions on the relative
competitiveness of the high-efficiency vehicle:

•

“Likely-Reject” condition: When 0     , we have C1   A1  C2   A2 , and
the high-efficiency vehicle is less competitive in the market; and
12

•

“Likely-Accept” condition: When    , we have C1   A1  C2   A2 , and
the high-efficiency vehicle is more competitive in the market.

We use a simple logit model to determine the probability f ( ) of
purchasing the high-efficiency vehicle in equation (1).

f ( ) 

e( C1  A1 )
e( C1  A1 )  e( C2  A2 )

(1)

The purchase probability in equation (1) is a function in consumer valuation
factor  . When the average consumer valuation level, denoted as ̂ , is taken for
all consumers, the purchase probability of high-efficiency vehicles without
heterogeneity, is f NoHet ( )  f (ˆ ) . When the heterogeneity in consumer valuation
is considered, we expect different  for different consumers. To approximate this
heterogeneity, the whole population of consumers can be partitioned into multiple
non-empty consumer segments i  1,..., n , with each segment i to have its
population share i ( 0  i  1), and consumer valuation level at i . Then, we have
the following condition:



n
i

i  1 , and



n
i

ˆ . The purchase probability

i i 

NoHet
( )  f (
without heterogeneity can be determined as, f
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  ) . We can also
n

i

i

i

n

determine the purchase probability with heterogeneity, namely f

Het

( )   i f ( i )
i 1

.
Let dom be a domain of the  , where i  dom , for i {1,..., n} . Based on
Jensen’s inequality (Cvetkovski, 2012), there are special properties as shown in
Lemma 1 if dom is strictly convex or strictly concave.

Lemma 1: If 0  i  1, i  dom , for i {1,..., n} and



n
i

i  1 , then the following

relationships between f NoHet ( ) and f Het ( ) hold, where f NoHet ( )  f (

  )
n

i

i

i

n

and f

Het

( )   i f ( i ) :
i 1

a) f NoHet ( )  f Het ( ) , if dom is strictly convex on  ; and
b) f NoHet ( )  f Het ( ) , if dom is strictly concave on  .

Lemma 1 indicates that the heterogeneity in consumer valuation increases
the purchase probability of high-efficiency vehicles if dom of f ( ) is strictly convex
(Lemma 1(a)), and reduces the purchase probability if dom of f ( ) is strictly
concave (Lemma 1(b)). To identify which domains of f ( ) have strictly convex or
concave properties, we derive the first and second derivatives of f ( ) in
equations (2) and (3), respectively.
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The first derivative of f ( ) :

f    

K2
 A2  A1 
K1

(2)

Where,

K1   e( C1  A1 )  e( C2  A2 )   0

(2.a)

K2  e( C1 C2  A1  A2 )  0

(2.b)

2

In equation (2), f     0 , because A1  A2 . Therefore, f ( ) is a strictly
increasing function. As  increases when consumers have higher valuation of fuel
economy, the purchase probability or the sale of high-efficiency vehicles also
increases.

The second derivative of f ( ) :

f     

( A1  A2 ) 2
1  e2(C1 C2  A1  A2 ) 

2
K1

(3)

In equation (3), when 0     , C1  C2   A1   A2  0 , and f     0 ;
when    , C1  C2   A1   A2  0 , and f     0 . Therefore, for domain of the
“Likely-Reject” condition (i.e., dom  {0     } ), f ( ) is a strictly convex
function, and for domain of the “Likely-Accept” condition (i.e., dom  {   } ),
15

f ( ) is a strictly concave function. With Lemma 1, we can derive Theorem 1 as
follows.

Theorem 1: Compared to the condition when the heterogeneity in consumer
valuation is not considered:
a) The heterogeneity increases the purchase probability of high-efficiency vehicles
when all segments have the “Likely-Reject” conditions (i.e., i {0     } , for

i {1,..., n} ); and
b) The heterogeneity reduces the purchase probability of high-efficiency vehicles
when all segments have the “Likely-Accept” conditions (i.e., i {   } , for

i {1,..., n} ).

Theorem 1 depicts two conditions that the heterogeneity in consumer
valuation affects the market acceptance (measured by purchase probability) of
high-efficiency vehicles and thus affect the compliance with CAFE standards.
Examples of heterogeneity impacts are shown in Figure 3.1.
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Probability of Purchasing Vehicle 1
- f(α)

100%
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80%
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2

3

4
5
6
7
8
Perceived present value of unit annual cost - α
Probability of purchasing vehicle 1
Three segments - α: (1) 2.5, (2) 3.5, and (3) 4.5

(a) “Likely-Reject” Condition
Probability of Purchasing Vehicle 1
- f(α)

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

f(α)nohet= 88.1%
f(α)het= (66.1%+88.1%+96.6%)/3=83.6%
2

3

4
5
6
7
8
Perceived present value of unit annual cost - α
Probability of purchasing vehicle 1
Three segments - α: (1) 5.5, (2) 6.5, and (3) 7.5

(b) “Likely-Accept” Condition
Figure 3.1. Examples of impacts of the heterogeneity
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In particular, Figure 3.1(a) shows an example of the “Likely-Reject”
condition, and the f ( ) function is hypothetically defined. There are three distinct
valuation levels, at 2.5, 3.5 and 4.5 with equal population shares. If we take the
average valuation level and then calculate the sale probability, it will be 11.9%.
However, if the heterogeneity is considered, calculate probability separately for the
three valuation levels, and then take the average of the three probability values.
Then, the probability becomes 16.4% which is higher than 11.9%. Similarly, Figure
3.1(b) shows an example of the “Likely-Accept” condition. There are three distinct
valuation levels, at 5.5, 6.5 and 7.5 with equal population shares. The probability
of purchasing the high-efficiency vehicle with the heterogeneity is 83.6%, which is
lower than 88.1% for the condition without the heterogeneity.
Note that, these two conditions have their specialty, as all consumer
segments should either be in the “Likely-Reject” or the “Likely-Accept” condition.
However, though not proved in this study, the heterogeneity may still have impacts
when most consumers belong to one condition (e.g., “Likely-Reject”) while the
remaining consumers belong to the other condition (e.g., “Likely-Accept”).

18

3.2 Evaluation of Impacts of the Heterogeneity on CAFE
Compliance

To analyze impacts of the heterogeneity in consumer valuation on CAFE
compliance, more complex conditions should be considered, such as a higher
variety of vehicle choices, detailed CAFE credit programs, and the volatile oil price.
We followed a consumer choice based simulation approach (Xie and Lin, 2017b)
to evaluate the heterogeneity impacts on the CAFE Compliance for the entire LDV
fleet in the U.S.. In particular, an existing vehicle choice model, namely the MA 3T
model developed by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Lin and Greene, 2010;
Lin and Li, 2014; Liu and Lin, 2016) is used, to simulate market acceptance of
vehicle choices with different fuel economies. The core of the model is a nested
multinomial logit discrete choice model, and takes calibrated baseline or userdefined assumptions on technology attributes (e.g., vehicle cost and fuel
economy), consumer behavior (e.g., driving intensity), policies (e.g., incentives),
and infrastructure development levels (e.g., oil price). For more details of the MA 3T
model, interested readers can refer to studies (Lin and Greene, 2010; Lin and Li,
2014; Liu and Lin, 2016).
Graph representations of the modeling framework is shown in Figure 3.2.
In particular, all modeling assumptions such as technology cost and fuel economy
are input into the MA3T model which will yield the sale by vehicle choice (i.e., by
19

class, technology, and variant). Then, together with the guidelines by the CAFE
standards, we can estimate the CAFE compliance levels for the entire national
fleet. Then, we can evaluate how heterogeneity will affect the CAFE compliance.

Figure 3.2. Modeling Framework in Analyzing Heterogeneity Impacts on CAFE
Compliance

3.2.1 Vehicle Classes, Technologies, and Variants
To reflect the diversity in vehicle classes and footprints in the real-world market,
we consider four vehicle classes, including mid-sized cars (Car), small sport utility
vehicles (S-SUV), pickup trucks (Pickup) and large sport utility vehicles (L-SUV).
Car and S-SUV belong to passenger cars, while Pickup and L-SUV belong to
20

trucks. For each vehicle class, we consider major conventional vehicle (CV)
technologies that are expected to play a major role in complying with the CAFE
standards (EPA et al., 2016). These CV technologies include conventional sparkignition technology (SI-Conv), conventional compression-ignition technology (CIConv),

spark-ignition

hybrid

electric

vehicle

technology

(SI-HEV),

and

compression-ignition hybrid electric vehicle technology (CI-HEV). Alternative fuel
vehicle (AFV) technologies such as electric vehicles (EV) are not considered in
this study (Reasons are demonstrated in Section 3.2.2).
Among all CV technologies, the SI-Conv takes the largest market share in
today’s LDV fleet (Davis et al., 2015). To simulate consumer acceptance between
high- and low-efficiency vehicle choices, we adopted Xie and Lin (Xie and Lin,
2017b)’s approach to include three variants of the SI-Conv technology for each
class: (1) Variant A has fuel economy at the CAFE target with FE A  FE Target ; (2)
Variant B (low-efficiency) has fuel economy  (%) lower than the CAFE target with
FE B  FE Target  (1   ) , where  is the standard deviation (17.5%) in fuel economy

in the 2008 fleet (DOE, 2015); and (3) Variant C (high-efficiency) has fuel economy

 higher than the CAFE target with FE C  FE Target  (1   ) . With all other vehicle
properties remain the same, Variant C is expected to be more expensive than
Variant A with additional fuel efficiency technologies, while Variant B is the
cheaper. For the remaining CV technologies, only one variant is considered per
technology. All technology cost, footprint, and fuel economy data by class,
21

technology, variant, and model year are adopted from the study (Xie and Lin,
2017b). In particular, technology costs for the three Conv-SI variants are
determined based on multiple piecewise linear cost curves (Xie and Lin, 2017b)
fitted using the high cost estimate of fuel efficiency technologies (National
Research Council, 2015). Note that, along each piecewise linear cost curve, the
incremental technology cost is relatively low when the fuel economy is at low
levels, and is increased when the fuel economy is at high levels. We will discuss
how this property affects the heterogeneity impacts in the Results Section. For
more details on the cost curves’ assumptions and properties, interested readers
can refer to the study by Xie and Lin (Xie and Lin, 2017b). All included vehicle
choice by vehicle class, technology, and variant is shown in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3. Included vehicle choice by vehicle class, technology

3.2.2 Modeling the Heterogeneity in Consumer Valuation of Fuel Economy
In the MA3T model, the consumer valuation factor  is modeled as discounted
perceived vehicle lifetime x, with the annual discount rate set at 7%. The current
version of the MA3T model does not support the heterogeneity in consumer
valuation of fuel economy and can only take one average perceived vehicle lifetime
x̂ for all consumers. The following approach is taken to model the heterogeneity

with the MA3T to determine the sales with heterogeneity Y jtHet for each vehicle
choice j  J in model year t  T :
23

•

Step 1: For each heterogeneity segment i {1,..., n} , the MA3T is run one
time with converted perceived vehicle lifetime xi and we obtain vehicle sale

Y jt ( xi ) , for vehicle choice j  J in model year t  T .
•

Step 2: Given the average perceived vehicle lifetime x̂ , the MA3T is run one
more time, and we obtain vehicle sale without heterogeneity Y jt ( xˆ ) , for
vehicle choice j  J in model year t  T .

•

Step 3: Finally, we determine Y jtHet using equation (4) that calculates the
weighted average sales considering all heterogeneity segments for each
vehicle choice j  J in model year t  T .

n

Y

Het
jt

  i 
i

Y jt ( xi )

 Ykt ( xi )

 Ykt ( xˆ )

(4)

kJ

kJ

As aforementioned, AFV technologies, mainly EVs, are not considered in
this study. Please note that, EV sales in recent years were mainly stimulated by
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) PEV incentive. For an
automotive manufacturer, the incentive program will start to phase-out when an
accumulated sale of 200,000 EVs is achieved. If EVs are modeled in this study,
the estimation of phase-out time of the ARRA incentive has interdependency with
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the cumulative EV sales. Then, the above approach in estimating vehicle sales
with heterogeneity does not work, as different consumer segments are interrelated in the EV market. Therefore, integration of AFVs in the analysis needs a
more advanced modeling framework, and is considered as a future work.

3.2.3 Discussions on “Likely-Accept” and “Likely-Reject” Conditions in
CAFE Compliance
The concepts of “Likely-Accept” and “Likely-Reject” conditions introduced in
Section 2.1 will still be used to explain impacts of the heterogeneity on compliance
with the CAFE standards. Among multiple vehicle choices, the two conditions can
be approximately determined by the relative competitiveness between highefficiency (i.e., Variant C for SI-Conv) and low-efficiency (i.e., Variant B for SIConv) vehicle choices. When Variant C has larger market share, there is the
“Likely-Accept” condition, and when Variant B has larger market share, there is the
“Likely-Reject” condition.
In the real-world vehicle market, the average valuation level of fuel economy
is a main factor that affects the two conditions. In particular, relatively low valuation
level can yield the “Likely-Reject” condition for high-efficiency vehicles, while
relatively high valuation level can contribute to the “Likely-Accept” condition. The
two conditions are also dependent on other factors, such as costs of fuel efficiency
technologies and oil price. For example, if incremental cost for increasing fuel
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economy is relatively low, even though consumers may have low valuation of fuel
economy in the market, high-efficiency vehicles may still be popular. On the other
hand, if there is a continuous low oil price environment, even though consumers
may have high valuation of fuel economy, consumers are more likely to choose
low-efficiency vehicles.
The “Likely-Accept” condition can increase the confidence in the CAFE
compliance. However, it may not always secure the compliance, which also
depends on the actual fuel economies for both high- and low-efficiency vehicles in
a fleet. We can use a simple example to prove it by contradiction as follows. In a
fleet, we assume that there are two vehicle choices (I and II), which have the same
footprint with target fuel economy at 30 MPG. Choice I’s actual fuel economy is at
20 MPG and choice II’s is at 40 MPG. We assume that there is a “Likely-Accept”
condition for choice II which has a sale of 51 vehicles while choice I has a sale of
49 vehicles. The fleet-wide achieved fuel economy based on harmonic-means is
then 26.8 MPG ((49+51)/(49/20+51/40)=26.8) which is smaller than 30 MPG, and
the CAFE is not complied with. Therefore, the “Likely-Accept” condition may not
always contribute to the CAFE compliance.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Impacts of the Heterogeneity on CAFE Compliance with
Various Valuation Levels

To evaluate how the heterogeneity in consumer valuation affects the CAFE
compliance, this study considers three scenarios, as shown in Table 4.1, with
different assumptions on consumer

valuation. For each scenario, the

heterogeneity is represented by dividing the population into three segments with
equal probability share. The “BaseValue” scenario is defined to have an average
of 10 years’ perceived vehicle lifetime, a default valuation level used in MA3T (Lin
and Greene, 2010). The “LowValue” scenario reflects low valuation of fuel
economy, and adopts an average 3.4-year accepted payback period from the
study in (Greene et al., 2013). For the first two scenarios, the heterogeneity
distributions in valuation levels are hypothetically defined, which are shown in
Table 4.1. Similar to the “LowValue” scenario, the “Y12SurveyValue” scenario also
has a low valuation level at an average 3.4-year payback period, but its
heterogeneity distribution is interpreted based on 2012 survey data from the study
in (Greene et al., 2013).
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Table 4.1. Scenarios of the Heterogeneity in Consumer Valuations
Perceived
Valuation
Scenarios

Segments

vehicle

Share

factor (α)
lifetime (x)
#1

5.02

6.4

33.3%

#2

7.02

10

33.4%

#3

9.02

14.8

33.3%

BaseValue

ˆ  7.0, and xˆ  10 years

Average
#1

1.4

1.5

33.3%

#2

3.4

4

33.4%

#3

5.4

7

33.3%

LowValue

ˆ  3.4, and xˆ  4 years

Average
#1

0.9

1

33.3%

#2

2.6

3

33.4%

#3

6.6

9.2

33.3%

Y12SurveyValue

ˆ  3.4, and xˆ  4 years

Average
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For each scenario, we compare the CAFE compliance under two different
assumptions, namely with or without consideration of the heterogeneity. Figure 4.1
and Figure 4.2 show the change in the CAFE target (Figure 4.1) and achieved
(Figure 4.2) fuel economies by the condition with heterogeneity relative to the
condition without heterogeneity. Positive values indicate an increase in target or

Difference in Target Fuel Economy
(MPGGE)

achieved fuel economy, while negative values indicate a decrease.
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Figure 4.1. Impacts of the heterogeneity on CAFE target fuel economy (relative
change compared to scenarios without heterogeneity)
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Difference in Achieved Fuel Economy
(MPGGE)
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Figure 4.2. Impacts of the heterogeneity on CAFE achieved fuel economy
(relative change compared to scenarios without heterogeneity)

As shown in Figure 4.1, the CAFE targets do not change significantly for all
three scenarios. In fact, changes in CAFE targets are mainly caused by changes
in preferences of vehicle classes (Xie and Lin, 2017b), and the heterogeneity in
consumer valuation has relatively small impacts on that.
However, Figure 4.2 does show significant changes (0.5 MPG) in the
CAFE achieved fuel economy. For all three scenarios, the heterogeneity reduces
the achieved fuel economy in earlier years (2012~2016). In earlier years, fleet
average fuel economies are at low levels, and the incremental cost is also low for
adding fuel efficiency technologies. Therefore, high-efficiency vehicles are popular
and there is the “Likely-Accept” condition (i.e., Variant C has more sales than
Variant B). With Theorem 1, the heterogeneity decreases the market acceptance
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of high-efficiency vehicles, and thus contributes to the reduction in the achieved
fuel economy in earlier years as shown in Figure 4.2. However, in later years
(2017~2025), the incremental cost of fuel efficiency technologies is increased as
the average fuel economy is increased. When consumers have low valuation of
fuel economy (i.e., “LowValue” and “Y12SurveyValue” scenarios), there is the
“Likely-Reject” condition for high-efficiency vehicles. Therefore, the figure shows
improvement in achieved fuel economy for the two scenarios. As “BaseValue”
scenario continues to allow the “Likely-Accept” condition, there is a continuous
reduction in achieved fuel economy in later years.
In addition to the impact analysis for each year, we are also interested in
evaluating cumulative impacts of the heterogeneity over the entire time horizon of
the national program. Thus, we demonstrate changes in cumulative credits or
debits in 2025 by the heterogeneity for the three scenarios in Figure 4.3. In each
year, credits are generated and accumulated when the achieved fuel economy is
higher than the target fuel economy. Accumulated credits can be banked for up to
5 years, and then will expire if they are not consumed. Debits occur when any
accumulated credit is depleted and the achieved fuel economy is lower than the
target fuel economy. Since debits are eventually to be paid through penalty cost
or traded between automotive manufacturers, we assume debits will not expire.
Note that, one credit or debit is equivalent to 0.1 MPG in difference between the
achieved and target fuel economies per vehicle. Details on methods used in
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determining cumulative credits and debits are demonstrated in the study in (Xie
and Lin, 2017b).

BaseValue

change in credits or debits per vehicle

0

0.0

LowValue
0.0

Y12SurveyValue
0.0

-2
-4
-6
-8
-10

-8.4
-9.4

-12
-14
-16
-16.3

-18
-20

credit

debit

Figure 4.3. Changes in accumulated credits or debits per vehicle sold in 2025
with the heterogeneity in consumer valuation of fuel economy

For the “BaseValue” scenario, the CAFE can be complied with in all years,
and only accumulated credits are presented in year 2025. Due to the “LikelyAccept” condition, the heterogeneity in consumer valuation reduces the cumulative
credits by 8.4 credits per vehicle. If the CAFE credit is valued at $5.5/credit (current
CAFE penalty cost (EPA and NHTSA, 2012)), then the heterogeneity can
cumulatively reduce $46’s benefit for each vehicle sold in 2025. On the other hand,
both the “LowValue” and “Y12SurveyValue” scenarios have deficiencies in
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compliance in later years and there are accumulated debits present in year 2025.
However, the “Likely-Reject” condition is presented in later years for each of the
two scenarios. Then, the heterogeneity results in a debit reduction by 9.4 debits
($52) and 16.3 debits ($89) per vehicle for the “LowValue” and “Y12SurveyValue”
scenarios, respectively.

4.2 Impacts of the Heterogeneity with Different Oil Price
Scenarios

In addition to the average level (i.e., low or high) of consumer’s valuation of fuel
economy, future oil price is another uncertain factor that affects consumers’
acceptance of fuel efficiency technologies. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate
the heterogeneity impacts with different oil price scenarios. All scenarios
demonstrated above are based on the reference oil price projection from the
Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 2016 (EIA, 2016). Additionally, we further consider
the low and high oil price projections. We aim to show how different oil price
conditions affect the heterogeneity impacts on the CAFE compliance, and we take
the “BaseValue” and “LowValue” scenarios as examples shown in Figure 4.4 and
Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.4. Impacts of the heterogeneity on the CAFE achieved fuel economy
with different oil price scenarios for the “BaseValue” scenario
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Figure 4.5. Impacts of the heterogeneity on the CAFE achieved fuel economy
with different oil price scenarios for the “LowValue” scenario

Figure 4.4 shows the “BaseValue” scenario with different oil price
projections. The high oil price projection has a continuous high oil price
environment. That strengthens the “Likely-Accept” condition for high-efficiency
vehicles. Therefore, the reduction in the achieved fuel economy is magnified when
the heterogeneity is present, and reaches 1 MPG by 2025. On the other hand, the
low oil price projection weakens the “Likely-Accept” condition for the “BaseValue”
scenario, and even causes the “Likely-Reject” condition. Therefore, the
heterogeneity contributes to an increase in the achieved fuel economy in later
years.
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Figure 4.5 shows the “LowValue” scenario with different oil price
projections. Unlike the “BaseValue” scenario, the “LowValue” scenario presents
the “Likely-Reject” condition in later years. The low oil price environment strengths
the “Likely-Reject” condition, and we observe similar heterogeneity impact
compared to the scenario with the reference oil price projection. In contrast, the
high oil price environment improves consumers’ acceptance of high-efficiency
vehicles, and make the period of the “Likely-Accept” condition longer in earlier
years. Thus, we observe that the heterogeneity continues to have negative impacts
on the achieved fuel economy before 2022. After 2022, the low valuation of fuel
economy significantly worsens the acceptance of high-efficiency vehicles. Even
under a high oil price environment, the LDV market still experiences the “LikelyReject” condition. Thanks to the heterogeneity, there are positive gains in the
achieved fuel economy.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

In this study, we successfully evaluated potential impacts of the heterogeneity in
consumer valuation of fuel economy on the market acceptance of high-efficiency
vehicles and the compliance with the CAFE standards. The impact analysis was
conducted in two approaches. In the first approach, we provided theoretical
analysis on how the heterogeneity may affect the purchase probability of highefficiency vehicles. In the second approach, we used a simulation method with the
MA3T model to evaluate the heterogeneity impacts on the CAFE compliance for
the entire national LDV fleet.
Our results indicate that the heterogeneity does affect the vehicle sales and
the CAFE compliance. The actual impact can be affected by two major conditions,
the “Likely-Accept” and “Likely-Reject” conditions defined based on the relative
acceptance of high-efficiency vehicles in the market. Under the “Likely-Accept”
condition, we have high confidence in the CAFE compliance, but the heterogeneity
in consumer valuation may create risks in the compliance. In contrast, under the
“Likely-Reject” condition, although risks are present for the CAFE compliance, the
heterogeneity can help to reduce these risks. The two conditions are mainly
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dependent on consumers’ average valuation of fuel economy, and are also
affected by other factors, including incremental cost of fuel efficiency technologies,
and future oil price projection.
There are two major limitations of this study: (1) AFVs (e.g., PEVs) are
excluded in the simulation analysis, and (2) this study does not investigate the
actual distribution of the heterogeneity in consumer valuation of fuel economy. In
response to the first limitation, one immediate future work is to improve the solution
method with the MA3T to incorporate the AFVs in the impact analysis of the
heterogeneity. To overcome the second limitation, more extensive long-term
research efforts are suggested to collected the required information to approximate
the heterogeneity distribution.
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